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  INTRODUCTION 
 Privacy and surveillance scholars increasingly worry that data 
collectors can use the information they gather about our behaviors, 
preferences, interests, incomes, and so on to manipulate us.1 Consider: 
investigative journalists recently discovered that Facebook allows advertisers 
to target vulnerable teenagers at moments when they feel “worthless” and 
“insecure.”2 “Sharing economy” firms like the ride-hailing company Uber 
have explored ways to influence not only the behavior of their customers but 
also that of their drivers, raising concerns about potential manipulation in the 
workplace.3 And recent elections in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, and elsewhere have raised questions about the use of similar 
techniques to manipulate democratic political processes.4 
 Charges that some practices are manipulative are a strong caution, 
even a rallying cry to protest. But what it means, exactly, to manipulate 
someone and how we might systematically distinguish cases of manipulation 
from other forms of influence—such as persuasion and coercion—has not 
been thoroughly enough explored in light of the unprecedented capacities that 
information technologies and digital media enable. This Article endeavors to 
meet this challenge—to develop a definition of manipulation that addresses 
these enhanced capacities, to investigate how information technologies 
facilitate manipulative practices, and to describe the harms to individuals and 
social institutions that flow from such practices. We use the term “online 
manipulation” to highlight the particular class of manipulative practices 
 
1 For example, Tal Zarsky offers an early discussion of the problem in Online Privacy, 
Tailoring, and Persuasion, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-
DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION (Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006). 
Frank Pasquale points to it throughout his book, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET 
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015). Frederik Zuiderveen 
Borgesius provides a helpful treatment of manipulation questions, especially as they relate to 
European privacy law in IMPROVING PRIVACY PROTECTION IN THE AREA OF BEHAVIOURAL 
TARGETING (2015). The most far-reaching treatment is Ryan Calo’s discussion of “digital 
market manipulation” and consumer protection law in Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014). 
2 Sam Machkovech, Facebook Helped Advertisers Target Teens Who Feel “Worthless," 
ARS TECHNICA (May 1, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2017/05/facebook-helped-advertisers-target-teens-who-feel-worthless/ 
[https://perma.cc/BPD9-6NKP]. 
3 See generally Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and 
Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623 (2017).  
4 See generally Zeynep Tufekci, Engineering the Public: Big Data, Surveillance, and 
Computational Politics, 19 FIRST MONDAY 7 (July 7, 2014), 
https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/4901/4097 (charting the questions of 
manipulating democratic political processes) [https://perma.cc/4XVR-KRKL].  
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enabled by a broad range of information technologies. We aim to contribute 
to philosophical accounts of manipulation with our conceptual and normative 
work by clarifying the nature of manipulative practices and drawing attention 
to the new universe of manipulation cases that information technology raises. 
Beyond philosophical accounts, however, our work engages with law and 
policy debates and aims to guide efforts to combat the corrosive impacts of 
manipulation. 
 In Part II of the Article, we describe cases that have been cited as 
instances of manipulation. Then, drawing on the nature of these cases and on 
discussions about manipulation in moral philosophy, we present our own 
account of manipulation in Part III, defining manipulation and distinguishing 
it from neighboring terms. We argue that at its core, manipulation is hidden 
influence—the covert subversion of another person’s decision-making power. 
In contrast with persuasion, which is the forthright appeal to another person’s 
decision-making power, or coercion, which is the restriction of acceptable 
options from which another person might choose, manipulation functions by 
exploiting the manipulee’s cognitive (or affective) weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities in order to steer his or her decision-making process towards the 
manipulator’s ends. Manipulation, therefore, shares certain features with 
nudging, though we argue that only some nudges are manipulative. In 
addition, some have argued that manipulation is merely a species of 
deception.5 We argue that while deception is often a tool of manipulation, 
manipulating someone does not necessarily require instilling false beliefs.  
 In Part IV, we describe the particular forms manipulation takes in a 
world where digital technologies pervade everyday life. We argue that 
information technology, for a number of reasons, makes engaging in 
manipulative practices significantly easier, and it makes the effects of such 
practices potentially more deeply debilitating. First, widespread digital 
surveillance makes it easy for data collectors and aggregators to identify our 
weaknesses. The information we volunteer and shed about our interests, 
preferences, desires, emotional states, beliefs, habits, and so on, provides 
everything a would-be manipulator needs to know about how to subvert our 
decision-making.6 Second, digital platforms offer a perfect medium through 
which to leverage those insights. They are dynamic, interactive, intrusive, and 
incisively personalizable choice architectures—decision-making contexts that 
can be specifically designed to adapt to and exploit each individual user’s 
 
5 For example, see our discussion of Robert Goodin’s theory of manipulation, infra Section 
II.B. 
6 Karen Yeung describes the problem in terms of “hypernudging.” Karen Yeung, Hypernudge: 
Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by Design, 20 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 118 (2017).  
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particular vulnerabilities.7 Finally, the reach of digital tools is enormous. 
Because digital interfaces mediate so much of so many people’s lives, they 
have the potential to affect far more people far more deeply than their analogue 
counterparts. Social media services, like Facebook, with millions or even 
billions of users can be leveraged as tools of massive and hyper-targeted 
manipulation. 
 In Part V, we turn to the harms of online manipulation. Subverting 
another person’s decision-making power undermines his or her autonomy. 
Given that respect for individual autonomy is a bedrock principle of liberal 
democracy, the potential for massive online manipulation is a cause for grave 
concern. We flesh out the notion of “vulnerability,” mapping its various types 
and the ways they are exploited as well as the places where different kinds of 
vulnerabilities interact to reinforce or exacerbate one another. We show how 
altering people’s choice architecture to exploit their vulnerabilities affects 
them. And we look to philosophical accounts of autonomy—specifically to 
accounts of socially-situated, relational autonomy—to bring these strands 
together, showing where and how manipulative influences thwart people’s 
capacity to form decisions they can recognize and endorse as their own.  
 We conclude by considering directions for future research, suggesting 
that it is especially important to consider the effects of online manipulation in 
different social contexts. Although we might be willing to tolerate some 
amount of external influence on our decision-making processes in consumer 
contexts, we likely want less interference in political contexts. We argue that 
the role autonomy plays in political decision-making is more fundamental and 
consequential than it is in consumer decision-making. Threats to the former 
therefore demand a more vigorous response. As we work to combat the new 
forms of manipulative practice made possible by information technology, we 
will need to distinguish carefully among the contexts in which they operate. 
 SOME CASES OF TROUBLING INFLUENCE 
 To provide concrete vehicles for our analysis, we introduce a few well-
known cases to our discussion. First, we consider targeted advertising in the 
commercial sphere, examining worrying reports that Facebook has the ability 
to target advertisements at teenagers during moments they are perceived to be 
especially vulnerable to influence. Second, we consider cases of so-called 
“algorithmic management”—strategies that gig platforms such as Uber use to 
influence worker behavior.8 Some of these strategies may verge on 
 
7 See generally Marjolein Lanzing, “Strongly Recommended” Revisiting Decisional Privacy 
to Judge Hypernudging in Self-Tracking Technologies, 32 PHIL. & TECH. 549 (2019).  
8 See generally Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark, Algorithmic Labor and Information 
Asymmetries: A Case Study of Uber’s Drivers, 10 INT’L J. COMM. 3758 (2016). 
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manipulative, raising difficult questions about appropriate influence in the 
workplace. Third, we consider Cambridge Analytica and claims that the 
political advertising firm engaged in voter manipulation. Together, these three 
cases exemplify concerns about online manipulation across social spheres—
in the market, in the workplace, and in the realm of politics. 
 Targeting Advertisements at Vulnerable Teenagers 
 Consumer advertising has long been contested ethical terrain. Its 
defenders argue that advertising plays an important role in an ideal competitive 
free market, informing consumers about products so they may effectively 
select among the alternatives and thus ensuring supply meets demand and 
prices adjust accordingly.9 Critics see the opposite. They identify trends in 
advertising that are increasingly aimed at provoking action against reason or 
circumventing reason altogether. Vance Packard famously charged the 
advertising industry with utilizing “motivation analysis,” psychological and 
psychoanalytical means to exploit “hidden weaknesses and frailties,” to appeal 
to non-rational and subconscious mental processes in service of marketing 
ends.10 And, of course, some stake a middle ground by suggesting that 
advertising can serve a useful function even though certain forms and 
outcomes are deeply problematic.11 The answer is neither to abandon nor 
outlaw but to divine criteria to determine when advertising is performing a 
useful service (such as informing consumers of and about products, promoting 
an active marketplace, or even promoting brand loyalty) and when it is not.12 
 With the commercialization of the Internet, it was inevitable that 
advertising would migrate online, and alongside it, detractors who regretted 
any such incursions.13 “Sponsored search,” which delivers advertisements 
tailored to specific search terms, was initially the norm and was developed by 
Web search services that could easily perform this match.14 This was quickly 
followed by advertising targeted at individuals, with DoubleClick (now owned 
 
9 See, e.g., JERRY KIRKPATRICK, IN DEFENSE OF ADVERTISING: ARGUMENTS FROM REASON, 
ETHICAL EGOISM, AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE CAPITALISM (1994). 
10 See generally VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957). 
11 Some in the advertising industry take this position, recognizing that there is such a thing as 
unethical advertising but rejecting the notion that all advertising is unethical. See, e.g., 
Wallace S. Snyder, Ethics in Advertising: The Players, the Rules, and the Scorecard, 22 BUS. 
& PROF. ETHICS J. 1 (2003). 
12 See, e.g., MICHAEL SCHUDSON, ADVERTISING, THE UNEASY PERSUASION: ITS DUBIOUS 
IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY (Routledge 2013) (1984). 
13 For a historical account of the emergence of online advertising, see generally TIM WU, THE 
ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE OUR HEADS (2016). 
14 See generally Bernard J. Jansen & Tracy Mullen, Sponsored Search: An Overview of the 
Concept, History, and Technology, 6 INT’L J. ELEC. BUS. 2 (2008).  
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by Google) taking advantage of the online advertising industry’s victory in the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) debate over the Web cookie standard, 
which allowed third-parties to set and retrieve cookies across numerous sites.15 
Who these third parties are and how they utilize the intelligence they glean 
from user surveillance is not exactly known, but the dogged research and 
publication of academics, activists, and the popular press has gone a long way 
to expose both technical methods and a dizzying array of commercial actors, 
including those in direct contact with users and those behind the scenes that 
now populate this space.  
 A recent case that captured much public attention offers a hint at how 
these practices are evolving. In May 2017, an Australian newspaper reported 
that it had obtained a leaked internal Facebook strategy document describing 
how advertisers could use the company’s platform to target advertisements at 
teenagers as young as fourteen years old at moments when they feel 
vulnerable. “By monitoring posts, pictures, interactions and internet activity 
in real-time, Facebook can work out when young people feel ‘stressed’, 
‘defeated’, ‘overwhelmed’, ‘anxious’, ‘nervous’, ‘stupid’, ‘silly’, ‘useless’, 
and a ‘failure,’” the report claims.16 Facebook responded that the report is 
misleading, and the features described are simply meant to “help marketers 
understand how people express themselves on Facebook,” not to target ads.17 
They did not deny, however, that their insights into teenagers’ emotional states 
could be used to influence the vulnerable, leaving many to wonder if all that 
stands between us and this kind of purported manipulation is Facebook’s 
company policies.18 
 The marriage of advertising and information technology has thus 
rendered urgent questions about what Cass Sunstein calls the “ethics of 
influence.”19 There is a growing sense that the ways of influencing consumers 
 
15 See generally David M. Kristol, HTTP Cookies: Standards, Privacy, and Politics, 1 ACM 
TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET TECH. 151 (2001); John Schwartz, Giving Web a 
Memory Cost Its Users Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2001), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/04/business/giving-web-a-memory-cost-its-users-
privacy.html [https://perma.cc/8S8L-MPTC]. 
16 Darren Davidson, Facebook Targets ‘Insecure’ Young People to Sell Ads, AUSTRALIAN 
(May 1, 2017), https://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/media/facebook-targets-insecure-
young-people-to-sell-ads/news-story/a89949ad016eee7d7a61c3c30c909fa6/ [perma.cc link 
unavailable]. 
17 Comments on Research and Ad Targeting, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 30, 2017), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/h/comments-on-research-and-ad-targeting/ 
[https://perma.cc/K3RM-NBMU]. 
18 See Nitasha Tiku, Get Ready for the Next Big Privacy Backlash Against Facebook, WIRED 
(May 21, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/welcome-next-phase-facebook-backlash/ 
[https://perma.cc/REZ9-QDEA]. 
19 See CASS SUNSTEIN, THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE: GOVERNMENT IN THE AGE OF BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCE (2016). 
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we once (perhaps reluctantly) tolerated have become intolerable—that what 
some call “persuasive” strategies are in fact manipulative. Ryan Calo claims 
that “digital market manipulation is a problem, if at all, because it constitutes 
a form of persuasion that is dangerous to consumers or society.”20 Karen 
Yeung points to the “persuasive, manipulative qualities” of nudges driven by 
big data.21 Anthony Nadler and Lee McGuigan suggest that “persuasive 
communication can manipulate consumer attitudes and behaviors.”22 Tal 
Zarsky argues that online surveillance “might facilitate the manipulation of 
subjects.”23 
We applaud these efforts to bring renewed scrutiny to consumer 
advertising practices in light of the powerful digital socio-technical systems 
that now convey them. What is lacking in this emerging literature, however, 
is conceptual clarity about what exactly online manipulation is, how it differs 
from other forms of influence, and how, normatively, it ought to be addressed. 
These are the questions we take up below. 
 Algorithmically-Nudged Labor 
 On April 21, 2017, Noam Scheiber wrote for The New York Times: 
And yet even as Uber talks up its determination to treat drivers 
more humanely, it is engaged in an extraordinary behind-the-
scenes experiment in behavioral science to manipulate them in 
the service of its corporate growth—an effort whose 
dimensions become evident in interviews with several dozen 
current and former Uber officials, drivers and social scientists, 
as well as a review of behavioral research.24  
 Drawing on academic research, Scheiber cites several practices 
supporting these assertions. The backdrop is Uber’s insistence that drivers are 
not employees. Instead, they are independent contractors taking advantage of 
Uber’s software platform, which connects drivers with people needing rides 
and for which Uber charges commission.25 Although both Uber and its drivers 
 
20 Calo, supra note 1, at 1020. 
21 Yeung, supra note 6, at 119. 
22 Anthony Nadler & Lee McGuigan, An Impulse to Exploit: The Behavioral Turn in Data-
Driven Marketing, 35 CRITICAL STUD. MEDIA COMM. 151, 161 (2018). 
23 Tal Z. Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
157, 158 (2019).  
24 Noam Scheiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers’ Buttons, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/uber-
drivers-psychological-tricks.html [https://perma.cc/4UU8-YUV6]. 
25 Id. 
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make money through rides, incentives are not neatly aligned. To compete 
successfully with other companies, generally, Uber must serve riders within 
the shortest timeframe and at the lowest cost. Purportedly lacking the coercive 
clout of an employer, Uber has devised a range of features to encourage driver 
behaviors that are profitable for the company, though, some have argued, not 
optimal for drivers. 
 Because conditions of high rider demand and low driver supply yield 
price surges, they are favored by drivers. Uber’s interests, however, are best 
served by many drivers serving as many riders as possible, with prices that 
beat those of their competitors. Accordingly, Uber barrages drivers with texts, 
emails, popups, and carefully designed graphics to keep them behind the wheel 
and to direct them, ostensibly, to areas of highest demand. One of the 
techniques cited by critics is the carefully curated graphic representations of 
predicted needs.26 For example, the inclusion of sporting events or bar-closing 
times hint that both demand and the likelihood of surge pricing will be high.27 
In other words, drivers are presented with vague promises and enticed by heat 
map estimates, which conflate real-time and predictive demand. They are thus 
nudged toward performing a service for highly uncertain rewards in a manner 
Ryan Calo and Alex Rosenblat liken to a “bait and switch.”28 
 A second feature is to urge drivers to continue working as they reach 
the end of a shift and try to log out of the system. They may receive push 
notifications reading, “Are you sure you want to go offline? Demand is very 
high in your area. Make more money, don’t stop now!” and accompanied by 
a surge icon.29 Or the app may indicate that they are approaching some 
arbitrary earnings level for that shift, e.g., “you’re $10 away from making 
$330!”30 These are attempts to exploit a well-known decision-making 
vulnerability—“people's preoccupation with goals—to nudge them into 
driving longer”—evidenced in robust findings from behavior research.31 
Similar effects are imputed to the gamification of Uber’s interactive app, 
which shows work status (hours, earnings, rides, etc.) in game-like formats 
known for their power to hold players at the game console, and, presumably, 
drivers at the wheel. And Uber utilizes automatic queuing, a strategy familiar 
to those who subscribe to streaming services such as Netflix or Amazon Video. 
Before a ride ends Uber cues up the next ride request, making it just a bit more 
 
26 Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 3, at 1662. 
27 Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 8, at 3769 (“We also want to remind you that we predict that 
New Year’s Eve will be the busiest time of the year. With such high demand, it will be a great 
night to go out and drive!”).  
28 Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 3, at 1662. 
29 Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 8, at 3768. 
30 Scheiber, supra note, 24. 
31 Id. 
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difficult to refuse than to take on another ride.32 Although Uber responded to 
concerns by allowing automatic queuing to be disengaged, the feature is 
engaged by default and reloads after breaks.33 Uber is not alone in employing 
these practices.34  
 In describing Uber’s practices, critics regularly cite to behavioral 
science research that reveals human vulnerability to forms of irrational, biased, 
and bounded thinking, as well as tendencies toward compulsive and even 
addictive ruts.35 These cognitive vulnerabilities range from well-studied 
phenomena,36 such as loss aversion and preoccupation with goals, to what 
Natasha Schüll, in her study of addictive gambling machines, calls “ludic 
loop,” a compulsion to keep playing.37 It even extends to the practice of Uber 
employees taking on female personas based on experimental findings that 
suggest the majority male driver population is more likely to engage with 
messages emanating from female rather than male communicators.38 While 
these critics have raised a number of ethical concerns, including coercion, 
excessive control through punitive measures, exploitation, and power and 
information asymmetries, importantly for this discussion they also claim these 
practices can be manipulative, raising deep ethical questions about which 
forms of influence are appropriate in the workplace.39 
 Psychographic Profiling and Election Influence 
 In March 2018, sudden public interest arose in whether or not the 
political services firm, Cambridge Analytica, had improperly used Facebook’s 
advertising platform to exert influence in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 
While many questions about the case remain unanswered, many commentators 
have pointed to the possibility that the purported influences were 
manipulative. 
 Piecing together a story from public media, and conceding that it 
includes contradictions and denials, it appears that Cambridge Analytica 
 
32 Id. (“It requires very little effort to binge on Netflix; in fact, it takes more effort to stop than 
to keep going.”) 
33 Id. 
34 Id.; see also Tae Wan Kim & Kevin Werbach, More Than Just a Game: Ethical Issues in 
Gamification, 18 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 157, 157–73 (2016). 
35 See, e.g., Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 3; Scheiber supra note 24; Luke Stark, Algorithmic 
Psychometrics and the Scalable Subject, 48 SOC. STUD. SCI. 204 (2018). 
36 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
37 NATASHA DOW SCHÜLL, ADDICTION BY DESIGN: MACHINE GAMBLING IN LAS VEGAS 
(2014). 
38 Scheiber, supra note 24. 
39 Id. 
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employed a company called Global Science Research (GSR) to generate vast 
repositories of digital user profiles. These repositories were initially seeded by 
the results of a personality quiz, “thisisyourdigitallife” (2014), administered 
by Aleksandr Kogan, a lecturer in the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Cambridge and the head of GSR.40 Kogan distributed the quiz 
through a Facebook app after being refused access to a dataset Michael 
Kosinski had assembled with colleagues at Cambridge and Microsoft 
Research for their widely cited study published in the Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Science.41 Subjects, limited to U.S. voters with Facebook 
accounts, each received a few dollars for taking the quiz and providing access 
to their Facebook accounts. From the few hundred thousand quiz-takers, 
Cambridge Analytica accumulated tens of millions of Facebook user accounts 
through a feature (no longer active) that allowed developers to gain access to 
the accounts of “friends” of quiz-takers—a number possibly as high as 87 
million.42 
 We can only surmise that Kogan’s work with Cambridge Analytica 
was inspired by the Kosinski, et al. study, which demonstrated that a 
tremendous amount can be inferred about individuals from Facebook “likes” 
alone. Such inferences include gender, sexual orientation, race, religion, 
political views, relationship status, substance use, and size and density of 
friendship networks.43 The study further claimed to uncover correlations 
between “like” patterns, psychological traits (such as intelligence as measured 
by Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices), and personality profiles (such as 
openness, agreeableness, emotional stability, and conscientiousness as 
measured by the International Personality Item Pool). 
 This provides context for the claims made by Christopher Wylie, one 
of Cambridge Analytica’s co-founders-turned-whistleblower: “We exploited 
Facebook to harvest millions of people's profiles and built models to exploit 
what we knew about them and target their inner demons. That was the basis 
 
40 Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook Profiles 
Harvested for Cambridge Analytica in Major Data Breach, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-
us-election [https://perma.cc/X58U-SJ8Z]. 
41 Michael Kosinski et al., Private Traits and Attributes are Predictable from Digital Records 
of Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5802 (2013). 
42 Cecilia Kang & Sheera Frankel, Facebook Says Cambridge Analytica 
Harvested  Data  of  Up to 87 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/mark-zuckerberg-testify-congress.html 
[https://perma.cc/VFZ8-3W2Q]. 
43 Kosinski et al., supra note 41. 
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the entire company was built on.”44 According to news reports, Cambridge 
Analytica claims to have built “psychographic” profiles on approximately 220 
million U.S. voters based on 5,000 pieces of data.45 In a 2016 speech, then-
CEO Alexander Nix boasted about Cambridge Analytica’s ability to 
personalize messages in a range of media from direct mail, to online cookie-
driven ad targeting, to social media banners, and even to set-top televisions.46 
Cambridge Analytica’s personalized approach was different from past 
advertising, Nix claimed, because “we don’t need to guess at what creative 
solution may or may not work. We can use hundreds or thousands of 
individual data points on our target audiences to understand exactly which 
messages are going to appeal to which audiences.”47 Cambridge Analytica’s 
strategies also differed from traditional mass advertising—even advertising 
that is targeted at defined demographic groups, such as age, race, 
socioeconomic class, etc. “[W]e’ve rolled out a long form quantitative 
instrument to probe the underlying traits that inform personality,” Nix 
claimed, which measures:  
openness—how open you are to new experiences; 
conscientiousness—whether you prefer order and habits and 
planning in your life; extraversion—how social you are; 
agreeableness—whether you put other people’s needs and 
society and community ahead of yourself; and finally 
neuroticism—a measurement of how much you tend to worry. 
By having hundreds and hundreds of thousands of Americans 
undertake this survey, we were able to form a model to predict 
the personality of every single adult in the United States of 
America.48 
 Compiling profiles is one thing. But even assuming one accepts the 
premises upon which claims about these profiles are based—that personality 
tests, augmented with inferences based on online measures, such as Facebook 
“likes,” produce sound profiles—it is another thing to go from psychographic 
 
44 Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal So Far, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/cambridge-analytica-facebook-scandal-
180327172353667.html [https://perma.cc/PU4C-KNSN]. 
45 Carole Cadwalladr, Google, Democracy and the Truth About Internet Search, GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 4, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/04/google-democracy-
truth-internet-search-facebook [https://perma.cc/5ZJ4-GAWV]. 
46 Alexander Nix, Cambridge Analytica–The Power of Big Data and Psychographics, 
Presentation at the 2016 Concordia Summit (Sept. 27, 2016), in YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8Dd5aVXLCc [https://perma.cc/N9C6-HTMJ].  
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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profiles to targeted messaging. This step requires tailoring messages to 
correspond to the specific personality traits of their recipients. Matz et al. 
claim to have shown experimentally that “targeting people with persuasive 
appeals tailored to their psychological profiles can be used to influence their 
behavior as measured by clicks and conversions.”49 The business literature is 
filled with studies that claim to “prove” the effectiveness of conventional ad 
targeting, and there are possibly industry studies, not revealed publicly, 
showing that targeting works. As to pinpointing advertisement recipients, we 
learned that Facebook, while it does not allow marketers to target 
advertisements based on psychological traits directly, “it does so indirectly by 
offering the possibility to target users based on their Facebook Likes.”50 In a 
2018 paper, computer scientists Irfan Faizullabhoy and Aleksandra Korolova 
demonstrated that one can get around technical enforcement of policies 
disallowing overly narrow targeting and successfully target particular 
messages down to the individual.51 
 In any event, the popular embrace of claims about the efficacy of these 
methods in the broadest terms very likely stirs its continuing appeal even in 
the absence of hard evidence. For the purposes of this article, we do not need 
to demonstrate that Cambridge Analytica’s efforts had a deep and meaningful 
impact on the U.S. presidential election. While it is unlikely that its effects 
were dispositive, that they worked, at some level, seems incontrovertible. 
More importantly, there is every reason to believe efforts like these will 
continue to evolve, and worries about online manipulation in political contexts 
will continue to grow.52 Our goal, then, is to reveal the dimensions of these 
practices that make them manipulative, and in so doing, expose why they are 
deeply disturbing. 
 DEFINING MANIPULATION 
 Manipulation is a tricky term, much like the behavior it describes. 
Colloquially, to manipulate something is to steer or control it. One often 
speaks of manipulating complex technical instruments, devices that would do 
nothing at all without human direction. For example, cars are manipulated via 
steering wheels and pedals, and computers are manipulated via keyboards and 
 
49 S.C. Matz et al., Psychological Targeting as an Effective Approach to Digital Mass 
Persuasion, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 12714, 12715 (2017). 
50 Id.  
51 Irfan Faizullabhoy & Aleksandra Korolova, Facebook’s Advertising Platform: New Attack 
Vectors and the Need for Interventions, (Workshop on Technology & Consumer Protection, 
arXiv:1803.10099, 2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.10099 [https://perma.cc/39Z8-7P45]. 
52 For a sense of the broad contours of debates about voter microtargeting, see Frederick J. 
Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., Online Political Microtargeting: Promises and Threats for 
Democracy, 14 UTRECHT L. REV. 82 (2018). 
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mouse devices. Similarly, one can manipulate living, animate things by 
changing the way they would behave absent any interventions. Gardeners 
manipulate tomato plants by fastening them to a trellis, and trainers manipulate 
dogs by enticing them with treats. To manipulate a person is likewise to steer 
or control them, as though they were a car or a tomato plant.53 Manipulators 
are often described as “puppet masters” who pull their targets’ strings. 
 It is worth distinguishing at the outset between manipulation 
understood in this way—as steering or controlling a person—and the 
manipulation of institutions or systems. Given the recent rise of online 
disinformation campaigns, especially targeted at voters, there is growing 
concern about what some have termed “media manipulation” and its effects 
on election outcomes.54 Obviously, the ultimate goal of influencing the media 
is to influence the people consuming it. Likewise, influencing people can be a 
means of altering the institutions they participate in—for example, when they 
vote. At the heart of these worries, though, are concerns about individuals and 
the independence of their decision-making processes. It is this sense of 
manipulation—as influence over individuals—that occupies us here. 
 Manipulation, then, is a kind of influence—an attempt to change the 
way someone would behave absent the manipulator’s interventions. The 
question is what kind of influence it is. In the following section, we show how 
manipulation differs from related concepts. We consider what distinguishes 
manipulation from persuasion, as well as other familiar forms of influence—
coercion and deception. In general, persuasion is thought to be perfectly 
acceptable, while deception and coercion are not. If manipulation is like 
persuasion in relevant ways, then we might decide it is not worth worrying 
about. If it is like deception or coercion, we might worry indeed. Finally, we 
consider how manipulation differs from nudging, a form of influence about 
which there is considerably less agreement. 
 Persuasion, Coercion, and Manipulation 
 “Persuasion” has both broad and narrow meanings. In the broad sense, 
to persuade simply means to change someone’s mind—it is an umbrella term 
 
53 As Allen Wood argues, “The manipulative person ‘steers’ the other as a driver steers an 
automobile. The automobile is already moving through its own internal combustion engine 
and momentum, but its direction is influenced by the one who steers it.” Allen Wood, 
Coercion, Manipulation, Exploitation, in MANIPULATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 17, 33–34 
(Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2014). 
54 See generally Yochai Benkler et al., Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation, 
and Radicalization in American Politics (2018); Alice Marwick & Rebecca Lewis, Media 
Manipulation and Disinformation Online, DATA  &  SOC’Y  RES.  INST.  (May  15,  2017), 
https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/DataAndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisinformationOnli
ne.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4TY-446Q]. 
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covering nearly all forms of influence, from argumentation and rhetoric to 
pointing a gun at someone’s head. In this sense, persuasion includes both 
making someone an offer and making someone an offer they can’t refuse. By 
contrast, persuasion in the narrow sense (i.e., rational persuasion) means 
changing someone’s mind by giving reasons he or she can reflect on and 
evaluate. Distinguishing between these two meanings of the term is important 
because they carry significantly different normative connotations. Persuasion 
in the narrow sense is generally thought to be perfectly morally acceptable, 
whereas persuasion in the broad sense denotes both behaviors we accept and 
behaviors we do not accept. 
 Many authors writing about these issues use the term “persuasion” in 
the broad sense. Conceptually, there is nothing wrong with that. Normatively, 
however, in discussions about manipulation, it muddies the waters, raising 
questions about how and why a good thing (persuasion) becomes a bad thing 
(manipulation). For this reason, throughout this Article we use “persuasion” 
in the narrow sense, meaning rational persuasion, and the generic term 
“influence”—a term without normative baggage—to describe the category of 
which rational persuasion and manipulation are both members. 
 At an abstract level, there are two ways of influencing another person’s 
decision-making: change the options available to the other person  (their 
decision space) or change how they understand their options (their internal 
decision-making process).55 Persuasion, the paradigmatic form of respectful 
influence, works by operating either of these two levers. When we persuade 
someone to do something (or to refrain from doing it), we appeal openly to 
their capacity for conscious deliberation and choice. We offer arguments or 
incentives. We assume, in other words, that they pursue their own ends, and 
we try to demonstrate that doing things our way would advance them. Take, 
for instance, the manager of a car dealership. To persuade her sales team to 
work longer hours, she might argue that because shoppers stay out later during 
long summer days, working late during the summer would increase their odds 
of earning extra commissions. In this way, she appeals to her team members’ 
own ends—earning an income—and tries to show them that behaving the way 
she wants is a means to achieving those ends. She attempts to influence her 
team by changing the way they understand their options—i.e., by appealing to 
their internal decision-making process. 
 If her argument fails, the manager can shift strategies. Instead of 
offering an argument, she might offer an incentive, such as overtime pay. 
Rather than change how her team members understand their situation, the 
manager changes the situation itself. She alters their decision-space by 
reconfiguring the options available to them. This is equally a form of 
 
55 We will complicate this dichotomy later. See infra Section V.B. 
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persuasion. In either case, the attempted influence is forthright and 
transparent, and the decision is ultimately left entirely up to the staff. The 
manager successfully influences her team's behavior only when she convinces 
them to behave the way she wants, motivating them with abstract arguments 
or concrete incentives. 
 This example highlights what Joel Rudinow would call “resistible 
incentives.”56 Although the incentives change the terms being deliberated 
over, the change is not determinative; it is easy to imagine some of the team 
members deciding, on balance, that the overtime pay is not worth it. In that 
case, the manager has yet another option: she can coerce them. To coerce 
someone is to offer “irresistible incentives.”57 Or, to put the same point 
slightly differently, as Allen Wood does, coercing someone means eliminating 
all of the “acceptable alternatives.”58 The manager could threaten her team 
members’ jobs, or she could put a gun to their heads. She could, in other words, 
restrict her team members’ decision-spaces, arranging them such that they 
only have one acceptable option—behaving the way the manager wants.59 If 
we face irresistible incentives (or lack acceptable alternatives) we are forced 
to act as our coercers would have us act; we are deprived of choice. 
 Persuading someone leaves the choice of the matter entirely up to 
them, while coercing someone robs them of choice. At the same time, although 
coercing someone deprives them of choice, in an important sense, it leaves 
their capacity for conscious decision-making intact. After all, recognizing that 
some incentive is irresistible, or that an alternative is unacceptable, requires 
having our wits about us. If one did not understand that the only acceptable 
option available to them was to do as their coercer instructed, or if they could 
not act on that understanding, then they would have no motivation or no means 
to go along with the coercer’s plan. Coercing someone forces them to act the 
 
56 Joel Rudinow, Manipulation, 88 ETHICS 338, 342 (1978). 
57 An irresistible incentive, Rudinow argues, is one which could only be avoided through 
“heroism, madness, or something similarly extraordinary.” Id. at 341.  
58 Wood, supra note 53, at 21–23.  
59 What counts as irresistible or unacceptable might differ somewhat from person to person 
(the threat of being fired might be resistible/acceptable for someone with other job prospects, 
but irresistible/unacceptable for someone without them). Which is not to say that they are 
determined by the agent’s own beliefs or feelings about them. Rather, it is to say that what 
counts as an acceptable or unacceptable option can be determined, in part, by context. Id. As 
Wood writes, “there is sometimes an objective fact of the matter that certain alternatives are 
(or are not) acceptable to a given agent under specific circumstances.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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way the coercer wants, not by undermining or circumventing their decision-
making faculties, but by making the coercer’s way the only acceptable one.60 
 In one respect, persuasion and coercion are, therefore, opposites, since 
persuading someone leaves the choice of the matter entirely up to the target, 
while coercing someone deprives them of choice. But what persuasion and 
coercion have in common is that they attempt to influence without 
undermining the target’s decision-making powers. In cases of persuasion and 
coercion, the agent is steering the ship. When coerced, a person is forced to 
abandon their self-chosen ends (the destination, say), but it is still the coerced 
person who does the abandoning. They understand what is happening; they 
recognize it as the only acceptable option. They direct themselves to do as 
their coercer demands. If asked later what happened, why they acted the way 
that they did, the coerced person has no trouble explaining it. “My hands were 
tied,” they say, regretfully, “It was the only available option. I was forced to 
act against my will.” Or perhaps not: rare though they may be, there are 
occasions when a person with a gun to their head defies their would-be coercer 
anyway. There are heroic stories of German gentiles, under threat of death, 
refusing to give up their Jewish neighbors to the Nazis. That such a thing is 
even possible demonstrates that no matter how forceful the attempted 
coercion, it is ultimately the coerced person who makes the decision to act. 
 Manipulation, by contrast, means taking hold of the controls. To 
manipulate people is to displace them as the decider, to “subvert,” as Wood 
puts it, their capacity for self-government, to “undermine or disrupt the ways 
of choosing that they themselves would critically endorse if they considered 
the matter in a way that is lucid and free of error.”61 It is to deprive them of 
 
60 Christian Coons and Michael Weber write: “the instruments of coercion (threats, 
incarceration, and other penalties) are attempts to alter the context of choice, making it rational 
for you to comply. In this way, the coercer typically treats the coerced as rational. In fact, 
coercion depends on the target’s being rational.” Christian Coons & Michael Weber, 
Introduction: Investigating the Core Concept and Its Moral Status, in MANIPULATION: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 15 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2014). We agree. Note 
in the next sections, though, that ultimately, we do not argue that manipulation subverts 
rationality; rather, we argue that it subverts conscious, self-aware decision-making.  
61 We should note that we only follow Wood part of the way. For Wood, self-government is 
coextensive with rational decision-making—to self-govern is to decide rationally. Wood, 
supra note 53, at 35 (“What is characteristic of manipulative behavior is that it influences 
people’s choices in ways that circumvent or subvert their rational decision-making processes, 
and that undermine or disrupt the ways of choosing that they themselves would critically 
endorse if they considered the matter in a way that is lucid and free of error.”). We do not tie 
self-government or its disruption so closely to rationality. It is possible, on our account, to be 
irrationally influenced without being manipulated, just as it is possible to be manipulated and 
still decide rationally. The salient issue, to our minds, is not whether the influence appeals to 
the target’s rational faculties, but, rather, whether it appeals to their conscious decision-
making process. Which is to say, the issue for us is not rationality but awareness. 
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authorship over their actions.62 That is what it means to feel like someone 
else’s puppet: when a person is coerced that person feels used, when a person 
is manipulated that person feels played. 
 Of course, manipulation is rarely so thorough as to totally deprive its 
target of self-control or self-government. That is why many people intuitively 
believe that manipulation involves less control than coercion (and 
consequently, that people should almost always be excused for doing things 
they were coerced to do, but only sometimes be excused for things they were 
manipulated into doing). Rather than entirely displacing the target as the 
decision-maker, the manipulator insinuates himself in his target’s decision-
making process. In Sarah Buss’s words, he interferes with “the self-governed 
(and self-governing) activity we call ‘making up one’s own mind about how 
to act.’”63 To say that you “feel manipulated” is to say that you do not fully 
understand why you acted the way that you did, or whether your actions served 
your own or someone else’s ends. 
 Whereas persuasion and coercion work by appealing to the target’s 
capacity for conscious decision-making, manipulation attempts to subvert that 
capacity. It neither convinces the target (leaving all options open) nor compels 
the target (eliminating all options but one). Instead, it interferes with the 
target’s decision-making process in order to steer them toward the 
manipulator’s ends. Importantly, this is not meant to suggest that coercion is 
acceptable or less bad than manipulation, but that coercion and manipulation 
threaten an individual’s capacity to choose and pursue their own ends in 
different ways. Coercion is blunt and forthright: one almost always knows one 
is being coerced. Manipulation is subtle and sneaky. Rather than simply 
depriving a person of options as the coercer does, the manipulator infiltrates 
their decision-making process, disposing it to the manipulator’s ends, which 
may or may not match their own. 
 
62 Or more precisely, it deprives them of part authorship. In thinking about how we influence 
others, it is tempting to use as one’s baseline an imaginary uninfluenced person—a perfectly 
unencumbered decision-maker. This person is the imagined subject of much liberal social and 
political discourse. She is rational, deliberative, and fully autonomous, an individual in every 
sense of the word. She is the author of her own life story. It is important to recognize that this 
subject is a fiction. Although we are individuals, we are also social beings who exist 
inexorably with others, and the people we live and interact with affect us. Thus, as Joseph Raz 
argues, “an autonomous person is part author of his own life. His life is, in part, of his own 
making.” JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 204 (1986) (emphasis added). Autonomy 
is not the absence of influence, but the presence of self-government. To be autonomous—to 
be part-author of one’s own life—is to know that one’s decision-making is conditioned, and 
yet, still, to take one’s own reasons for acting as authoritative. It is this authority of one’s own 
reasons that manipulation subverts, as we discuss in Part IV, below.  
63 Sarah Buss, Valuing Autonomy and Respecting Persons: Manipulation, Seduction, and the 
Basis of Moral Constraints, 115 ETHICS 195, 195 (2005). 
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 The Means of Manipulation 
 The question, then, is how this is done—how are manipulators able to 
alienate their targets from their own decision-making powers and interfere 
with the way they make up their minds about how to act? Philosophers and 
political theorists have described a wide variety of purportedly manipulative 
techniques. Marcia Baron points to lies, false promises, applying pressure, and 
playing on people’s emotions.64 Wood adds encouraging false assumptions, 
fostering self-deception, and appealing to “character flaws.”65 Kate Manne 
discusses guilt trips.66 Buss considers certain kinds of seduction.67 
 The most systematic account is Robert Noggle’s influential theory that 
one manipulates another by causing their beliefs, desires, or emotions to 
deviate from certain ideals.68 Beliefs, for instance, are ideally true. Desires, 
according to Noggle, are ideally directed toward things we have reason to 
want. Emotions are ideally appropriate to the situation at hand. When we make 
decisions according to right-functioning rational decision-making processes, 
our beliefs, desires, and emotions approximate these ideals.69 Manipulating 
someone, Noggle argues, means corrupting rational decision-making by 
“adjusting” these “psychological levers”—belief, desire, and emotion—away 
from their ideal settings. One might deceive their target (causing them to have 
false beliefs), tempt them (creating a desire for what they lack reason to want), 
incite them (causing an inappropriate emotional response), and so on. 
 While there is much to like about this story, it fails to capture what is 
distinctive about manipulation—that it undermines our sense of authorship 
over our decisions. Causing someone to make non-ideal decisions is 
sometimes manipulative, but it is not manipulative in every case. Suppose you 
are a great lover of martinis but really ought not to drink. And knowing this, 
but not wanting to feel like lushes themselves, your friends parade the finest 
martinis before you, tempting you to have one. In this case your friends have 
 
64 See Marcia Baron, Manipulativeness, 77 PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS’N 37 (2003). 
65 See Wood, supra note 53, at 35. 
66 See generally Kate Manne, Non-Machiavellian Manipulation and the Opacity of Motive, in 
MANIPULATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 221 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2014). 
67 See Buss, supra note 63, at 195. 
68 Which ideals exactly are relevant here is up for some debate. For Noggle, manipulation 
involves inducing someone to deviate from what the manipulator believes are the ideals for 
beliefs, desires, and emotions. See Robert Noggle, Manipulative Actions: A Conceptual and 
Moral Analysis, 33 AM. PHIL. Q. 43, 47–48 (1996). Anne Barnhill endorses all of Noggle's 
account save this. In Barnhill’s view, the relevant ideals are those objectively in the target’s 
self-interest. Anne Barnhill, What is Manipulation?, in MANIPULATION: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 51, 65–72 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2014). 
69 Noggle, supra note 68, at 44–47. 
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caused you to desire what you ought not to have (or to feel particularly drawn 
to it). But have they manipulated you? 
 Surely not. If you really cannot resist the temptation, then your friends 
have offered you an irresistible incentive—they have coerced you. If you can 
resist it, and yet you do not, then you have simply been persuaded by bad 
reasons (e.g., “If a thing you love is paraded before you then you really ought 
to have it, regardless of the consequences”). Either way, you have not been 
deprived of authorship over your decision. You have chosen to drink; you have 
willed it. Or, at the very least, you were unable to will yourself not to drink. 
Indeed, this last possibility—that you suffered from weakness of will—
illustrates the point most clearly. If parading martinis in front of you caused 
an internal struggle, one you were aware of and engaged in with intention, 
there can be no doubt that it was you (in all your complexity) who made the 
final choice.70  
 To sharpen the point even further, manipulation cannot simply mean 
causing someone to make less-ideal decisions than they otherwise would, 
since it is possible to manipulate someone into making more ideal decisions. 
Imagine your friends (different ones) know you love martinis, but they also 
know you worry about gaining weight. Having heard that you intend to spend 
the evening drinking—which you agree you really should not do—your 
friends share articles on Facebook and Twitter about the high calorie content 
of alcohol and the correlation between drinking and weight gain, knowing you 
are likely to see them. You are unaware that your friends have plotted to 
influence you, but as a result of seeing the articles you decide not to drink. In 
this case, you have been manipulated since your friends have insinuated 
themselves covertly into your decision-making process and redirected it to 
their own ends. This is despite the fact that their ends (and the decision-making 
process that led you to them) are—by your own admission—more ideal. 
 Apart from the direction of the influence (toward or away from ideals), 
the salient difference between these two cases is that the influence in the first 
case is overt, while the influence in the second case is hidden. You would feel 
manipulated in the second case—if you later found out why your friends had 
posted those articles—because you would realize that you had been motivated 
by someone else’s reasons. You made what seemed at the time like a decision 
that was yours, only to find out that it was infected by external machinations. 
In the first case, by contrast, you knew while you were deciding that your 
friends were trying to influence your decision. Because you were aware of 
their influence, you could treat it as you would any other decision—you could 
 
70 Alan Ware makes a similar argument to this, but he frames his analysis in terms of 
opportunity for consent, rather than awareness of and authorship over the influence. See Alan 
Ware, The Concept of Manipulation: Its Relation to Democracy and Power, 11 BRITISH J. 
POL. SCI. 163, 169–70 (1981). 
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contemplate it, weigh it against other considerations, attempt to mount 
defenses against it, and so on. The decision you reached was therefore your 
own (to whatever extent our decisions are ever our own). It was no different, 
in this respect, from just happening to see a perfect martini at the next table 
over at dinner. You would be tempted by it, sure, but not manipulated. 
 The hiddenness of manipulative influences explains how it is possible 
to alienate someone from their own decision-making powers. In order to get 
someone to act the way you want without realizing why they are acting that 
way, they must be unaware of the influence. As soon as we become conscious 
of outside influence, of someone else’s plans and how we are implicated in 
them, we incorporate that influence into our own decision-making. Once you 
know someone else is trying to get you to do something, that fact becomes a 
regular part of how you make up your mind. It becomes one of the reasons that 
helps you explain your actions to yourself. Since we are never totally free of 
outside influence, what gives us (part) authorship over our own actions is that 
we regard our own reasons for acting as authoritative.71 Manipulation thwarts 
that. 
 Robert Goodin places the notion of hidden influence (or what he calls 
“deceptive influence”) at the center of his theory of manipulation. “One person 
manipulates another,” he writes, “when he deceptively influences him, causing 
the other to act contrary to his putative will.”72 Alan Ware agrees, arguing that 
for A to manipulate B it must be true that (among other things) “B either has 
no knowledge of, or does not understand, the ways in which A affects his 
choices.”73 Although nearly everyone else concedes that hidden influence is 
an effective means of manipulation, not everyone agrees that hiddenness is 
necessary. To demonstrate this point, a number of theorists have proposed 
cases of supposedly overt manipulation.74 Noggle invokes the image of Satan 
tempting Christ as he fasts in the wilderness.75 Anne Barnhill claims that 
blatant guilt trips are manipulative.76 Moti Gorin describes an employee who 
tries openly to get his co-worker—a recovering alcoholic—to relapse in order 
 
71 See RAZ, supra note 62, at 204; Buss, supra note 63, at 195. 
72 ROBERT E. GOODIN, MANIPULATORY POLITICS 19 (1980). We distinguish between 
manipulation and deception, below, and use the term “hidden influence” rather than 
“deceptive influence,” in order to keep the two concepts apart. Furthermore, as we argue in 
Part IV, in our view, it is not strictly necessary for manipulation to result in the target acting 
contrary to their putative will. It is possible, in other words, to be manipulated and still behave 
as one would have, absent the manipulation. 
73 Ware, supra note 70, at 165. 
74 Wood, supra note 53, at 38. Wood leaves the door open to the possibility that there might 
be cases of overt manipulation, but he does not develop the point.  
75 Noggle, supra note 68, at 44. 
76 Barnhill, supra note 68, at 60. 
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to beat her out for a promotion.77 In our view, these are not cases of 
manipulation, since they share all the relevant features of the martini case 
above. If you know you are being guilted (in Barnhill’s case) or tempted (in 
Noggle’s and Gorin’s cases), then you have not been deprived of authorship 
over your decision. Either you cannot resist the influence and have therefore 
been coerced, or you can resist it and do not, in which case you have simply 
been moved by bad reasons.  
 These arguments give us little reason to think manipulation can operate 
out in the open. It is only because the target of influence is unaware of or does 
not understand how they are being influenced that the manipulator’s 
intervention can infiltrate and disrupt the target’s decision-making process, 
steering them without force.  
 Deception and Manipulation 
 With this in mind, one can begin to see how manipulation is related to 
deception. To deceive someone is to cause them to hold false beliefs. This, of 
course, can be a powerful tool of manipulation. Imagine, once again, the 
manager of our car dealership. If she told her team they would be fired for 
refusing to work late but in fact lacked the authority to carry out the threat, or 
if she held a convincing, but fake, gun to their heads, then she would be 
deceiving them. She would be inducing them to act under false pretenses. 
Instead of changing or restricting the options open to her team members (i.e., 
persuading or coercing them), she would be disposing them to act the way she 
wanted by undermining their ability to understand their options. Here we have 
an example of deception in the service of manipulation. Although the team 
members know their manager is influencing them, they are misled about how 
she is influencing them. They are fed false beliefs about their options, which 
induces them to decide in ways they likely would not endorse if they had 
access to all the facts. 
 Deception is thus an important tool in the manipulator’s toolkit, but it 
is not the only one. While instilling false beliefs is a blunt way of controlling 
another person’s decision-making process, there are subtler means of shaping 
a person’s beliefs. Social scientists have shown that human reasoning is 
“bounded” in significant ways. When evaluating information, people use a 
variety of unreliable shortcuts and heuristics, which researchers describe as 
“cognitive biases.” Famously, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tverksy 
demonstrated that people are often influenced by irrelevant information (so-
called “anchoring effects”) and give more weight to evidence they can easily 
 
77 Moti Gorin, Towards a Theory of Interpersonal Manipulation, in MANIPULATION: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 73, 80–81 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2014). 
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recall (the “availability heuristic”).78 People draw different conclusions from 
the same information depending on how it is presented (“framing effects”), 
and so on.79 Because these cognitive biases are widespread and predictable, 
manipulators can easily treat them as vulnerabilities to exploit. Manipulators 
can remind targets of unimportant facts so that they give them undue weight. 
They can point out that their targets’ friends believe certain things in hopes 
that they will believe them too. They can frame information in misleading 
ways. Manipulation, therefore, need not involve outright deception; the truth 
can also be used to control our decision-making. 
 In fact, manipulators need not influence beliefs at all. To use Noggle’s 
metaphor, there are other “psychological levers” a manipulator can “adjust.”80 
Some of the most common examples of manipulation involve leveraging 
emotions and desires. If you and your partner are having a disagreement and 
you know they still feel guilty about something unrelated from the week 
before, you can subtly mention the source of guilt in conversation to wear 
down their resolve. Rather than create straightforward advertisements, where 
products are center-stage, marketers try to subliminally connect their products 
to our fantasies and aspirations by paying celebrities to appear with them or 
having them casually turn up on television and in films. 
 Though people like to imagine themselves as reliable and independent 
decision-makers, in fact they have many vulnerabilities to exploit. Beliefs, 
desires, and emotions form in response to a wide variety of factors, many of 
which operate outside conscious awareness. If a manipulator wants to 
influence someone without their knowledge, they need only intervene in a way 
that flies under the metaphorical radar. Deception exploits one kind of 
vulnerability—lack of perfect information—and can therefore be understood 
as a species of manipulation. But exploiting vulnerabilities in the way people 
form and manage desires and emotions is manipulative too. 
 Nudges and Manipulation 
 We have so far distinguished manipulation from persuasion and 
coercion, demonstrating that the former is hidden and works by exploiting 
vulnerabilities in the way we make decisions, while the latter operate out in 
the open, appealing directly to our capacity for conscious decision-making. 
We have also posited the relationship between manipulation and deception, 
 
78 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128 (1974). For Kahneman’s more recent, popular treatment, see DANIEL 
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).  
79 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 
59 J. BUS. 251, 257 (1986). 
80 Noggle, supra note 68, at 44–47. 
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arguing that people may deceive in order to manipulate, but that manipulation 
does not require instilling false beliefs. It remains to distinguish manipulation 
from nudging. 
 Now well-known, the term “nudge” was coined by the behavioral 
economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar Cass Sunstein, and refers to “any 
aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable 
way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives.”81 By “choice architecture,” Thaler and Sunstein mean the context 
in which people make decisions. To take one of their familiar examples, when 
someone is deciding what to buy at a cafeteria, the arrangement of options—
some at eye-level, others slightly out of reach—influences the choices they 
make as people are more likely to reach for what’s closest.82 Thus, in order to 
shape other people’s decision-making, one can alter their choice architecture 
to nudge them in a preferred direction. 
 The notion of choice architecture is useful for understanding 
manipulation in general, and online manipulation in particular; we carry this 
notion with us through the discussion that follows. Like manipulation, 
intentionally shaping someone’s choice architecture to nudge them in a 
particular direction involves influencing their decision-making without force. 
What’s more, nudges often work by leveraging cognitive biases. Those 
familiar with the growing literature on nudges will recognize many of their 
key features in our characterization of manipulation as hidden influence and 
our description of exploiting vulnerabilities as the primary means of 
manipulation. If the way options are selected, arranged, and presented (i.e. 
choice architecture) affects the way people understand and respond to them, 
and if such effects operate outside conscious awareness, the question arises as 
to where nudging ends and manipulation begins.83 
 Recognizing an overlap, Sunstein argues that while some nudges might 
be manipulative, most are not. To support this claim he offers a definition of 
manipulation very much in the spirit of our discussion. An influence is 
manipulative, he argues, “to the extent that it does not sufficiently engage or 
 
81 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 36, at 6. 
82 Id. at 1–4. 
83 See generally, e.g., Robert Noggle, Manipulation, Salience, and Nudges, 32 BIOETHICS 
164, 166–68 (2018); Thomas RV Nys & Bart Engelen, Judging Nudging: Answering the 
Manipulation Objection, 65 POL. STUD. 199, 203–08 (2016); Gérard Reach, Patient 
Education, Nudge, and Manipulation: Defining the Ethical Conditions of the Person-
Centered Model of Care, 10 PATIENT PREFERENCE & ADHERENCE 459, 460–61 (2016); Luc 
Bovens, The Ethics of Nudge, in PREFERENCE CHANGE: APPROACHES FROM PHILOSOPHY, 
ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 207 (Till Grüne-Yanoff & Sven Ove Hansson eds., 2009); 
Evan Selinger & Kyle Whyte, Is There a Right Way to Nudge? The Practice and Ethics of 
Choice Architecture, 5 SOC. COMPASS 923, 928–930 (2011); Daniel M. Hausman & Brynn 
Welch, Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 123, 130–35 (2010). 
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appeal to [the target’s] capacity for reflection and deliberation.”84 He 
disagrees, however, that manipulative influences must be hidden. Unlike the 
challenges to the hiddenness condition that we have already considered, 
Sunstein argues that while manipulation is usually hidden, we ought not to 
consider hiddenness its defining criterion because the notion of “hiddenness” 
is too difficult to spell out.85 What about an influence needs to be exposed, he 
asks, in order for it not to be hidden? When the government orders that graphic 
health warnings be presented on cigarette packs, must it also—in order not to 
be manipulative—disclose information about the particular psychological 
mechanisms that make such warnings effective?86 
 Although the question Sunstein raises is a good one, the answer is not 
as difficult as he suggests. Sunstein is surely right that when people make 
everyday decisions, much of what conditions their outcomes is not wholly 
apparent to them. People are not entirely self-transparent. They do not—and 
perhaps cannot—reflect on every belief, desire, emotion, and habit that 
impacts the decisions they reach. Moreover, they cannot know everything 
about how the world of choices they confront—whether in the natural world 
or the human-built one—came to be precisely the way it is, i.e., how the 
decision-making contexts they face were formed. Yet the reason this does not, 
generally, thwart a person’s capacity to act competently is that they are able 
to act on the basis of reliable assumptions. Upon encountering graphic health 
warnings, for example, the average person has no trouble intuiting why they 
are there or how—roughly—they work: the health bureaucracy is encouraging 
people not to smoke, both by providing information and by appealing to a 
visceral sense of fear and disgust. Hidden influences thwart such assumptions. 
If people learned after some time that the real reason graphic health warnings 
were placed on cigarette packages is that the alcohol lobby paid off 
government officials, in an attempt to drive people away from smoking and 
toward drinking, the influence would be hidden in the relevant sense and the 
public would rightly feel manipulated. 
 Interestingly, Sunstein’s definition raises an even more difficult 
question. Namely, what is “sufficient” engagement of a target’s capacity for 
reflection and deliberation? The notion of sufficiency here is a normative 
one—what constitutes sufficient engagement is a question about values. When 
attempting to influence someone, how much ought the influencer to engage 
their target’s capacity for reflection and deliberation? This normative 
component of Sunstein’s definition creates internal tensions in his account. He 
argues that “from the standpoint of welfare, there might . . . be a justification 
 
84 SUNSTEIN, supra note 19, at 82. 
85 Id. at 102–05. 
86 Id. 
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for hidden manipulation in . . . extreme circumstances—as, for example, when 
people are trying to stop a kidnapping or to save a kidnapping victim.”87 We 
agree that manipulation might be justified in such circumstances, but it is not 
clear why that situation is manipulative under Sunstein’s theory. If the hidden 
influence is justified, then it would seem that the level of engagement with the 
target’s (i.e., the kidnapper’s) capacity for reflection and deliberation was 
decidedly sufficient. Yet it is important to recognize that even in situations 
where manipulation might, ultimately, be justified, it is still manipulation; and, 
as a result, it carries with it a real harm, which must be weighed against 
potential benefits.88 
 Thus, while we agree with Sunstein’s conclusion that some nudges are 
manipulative and others are not, we believe that our account of manipulation 
as hidden influence better delineates between them. Sunstein suggests, for 
example, that disclosures (purely informational nudges) are not manipulative 
since they represent “an effort to appeal to [people’s] deliberative capacities” 
rather than bypass them.89 But there are different types of disclosures. 
Nutrition labels are straightforward—they simply provide consumers with 
some of the information they need to make an informed choice about what 
foods to buy. They are not manipulative because they are not designed to 
exploit a cognitive bias, and they instead encourage and strengthen the 
consumer’s capacity for conscious deliberation. And there is nothing hidden 
about them—people understand why they are there and what effects they are 
meant to have. Another case that Thaler and Sunstein cite approvingly is less 
clear. Deploying a so-called “social nudge,” the state of Minnesota informed 
its citizens that 90% of Minnesotans pay their taxes in order to encourage the 
10% who do not pay to comply.90 Depending on how this information was 
conveyed, this strategy is plausibly manipulative because, although the 
information it conveyed was true, its purpose may have been hidden.  
 In our view, nudges are manipulative if they are hidden and exploit 
vulnerabilities. Many nudges—indeed, most of the nudges that Thaler and 
Sunstein recommend—are transparent and work to correct cognitive 
vulnerabilities rather than exploit them. As such, they are not manipulative at 
all. Another distinction between nudges and manipulation, which we discuss 
at length in the sections that follow, stems from the fact that manipulation is 
usually targeted.91 In order to exploit someone’s vulnerabilities, one must 
know something about what those vulnerabilities are and how precisely to 
 
87 Id. at 104. 
88 We discuss the precise nature of that harm in Part IV, below. 
89 SUNSTEIN, supra note 19, at 82. 
90 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 36, at 66–65. 
91 See Patrick Todd, Manipulation, in 5 INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA ETHICS 3139, 3140 (Hugh 
LaFollette ed., 2013). 
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leverage them. Most nudges, by contrast, are not targeted to particular 
individuals. Like the cafeteria example, above, the sorts of nudges Thaler and 
Sunstein advocate for are meant to be applied in the same way to everyone. 
 As we discuss below, part of what makes information technology 
particularly well-suited to facilitating manipulation is that it allows for fine-
grained microtargeting, making it possible for potential manipulators to 
engage in what Karen Yeung calls “hypernudging.”92 Hypernudges are not 
only hidden, they precisely target and exploit individual vulnerabilities, 
making them much more difficult to resist. Although we can imagine mass 
manipulation, which attempts to influence large groups of people all in exactly 
the same way, the more targeted manipulation is the more we ought to worry 
about it. 
 Manipulation and Manipulative Practices Defined 
 At this point, we can pull these different strands together and define 
manipulation as imposing a hidden or covert influence on another person’s 
decision-making. That means influencing someone’s beliefs, desires, 
emotions, habits, or behaviors without their conscious awareness, or in ways 
that would thwart their capacity to become consciously aware of it by 
undermining usually reliable assumptions. This definition captures what is 
essential about manipulation—namely, that it disrupts the target’s capacity for 
self-authorship. Which is to say, it explains why, upon learning they have been 
manipulated, people feel like puppets. It differentiates manipulation from 
persuasion and coercion, which are forthright efforts to alter a person’s 
decision-making process. It reveals that nearly all instances of deception are 
also instances of manipulation, but not all manipulation is deceptive. And it 
helps distinguish between nudges that are manipulative and those that are not. 
Furthermore, we have considered how manipulators can impose hidden 
influences on their targets: by targeting and exploiting their cognitive, 
emotional, or other decision-making vulnerabilities.  
 An issue we have not considered in depth is whether or not a hidden 
influence must be intentionally imposed to be manipulation. We believe that 
it does. The notion of manipulation naturally evokes the image of a 
manipulator, and influences hidden by natural or accidental means would 
likely not undermine a person’s sense of self-authorship. It is known and 
expected that some of the underlying causes of experience lay outside 
conscious awareness. What is not expected is intentional meddling in other 
people’s decision-making. People assume—and ought to be able to assume—
that they do not live in the company of Descartes’ evil demon or on the set of 
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the Truman Show. Thus, when we discuss manipulation as “hidden or covert 
influence,” we mean such cases where hiddenness is intended. 
 Even with this definition in hand, however, identifying cases of 
manipulation is difficult because manipulation is a “success concept.”93 Which 
is to say, the claim that someone has been manipulated refers not only to the 
strategies employed by the influencer but also to the effects of those strategies 
on the influenced. Analogously, consider the distinction between lying and 
deceiving. To lie is to assert a falsehood. To deceive, by contrast, is to instill 
false beliefs. In order to determine whether or not someone has lied, one only 
needs to investigate the actions of the alleged liar. In order to determine 
whether or not someone has deceived, one needs to investigate the actions of 
the deceiver as well as the resulting beliefs of the deceiver’s target. The same 
is true of manipulation. Manipulation only exists where the attempt to 
manipulate succeeds and the manipulee’s decision-making is affected by the 
influence. Investigating cases of manipulation, therefore, requires a focus on 
the status of two parties—the intentions of the suspected manipulator and the 
beliefs and actions of potential manipulees. In many cases, establishing 
impacts on targets of manipulation may require far-flung empirical findings 
that are difficult, if not impossible, to access.  
 For this reason, we focus in what follows on the concept of 
manipulative practices—strategies that a reasonable person should expect to 
result in manipulation—and not on the success concept of manipulation, in 
toto. The preceding discussion points to three key characteristics of 
manipulative practices: they involve influences that (1) are hidden, (2) exploit 
cognitive, emotional, or other decision-making vulnerabilities, and (3) are 
targeted. Strictly speaking, the only necessary condition of manipulation is 
that the influence is hidden; targeting and exploiting vulnerabilities are the 
means through which a hidden influence is imposed. Indeed, targeting is best 
understood as an exacerbating condition: the more closely targeted a strategy 
is to the specific vulnerabilities of a particular manipulee, the more effective 
one can expect that strategy to be. Hidden influences not targeted at all still 
count, therefore, as manipulative, but we ought to worry more about 
manipulative practices the more targeted they are. As we will see in the next 
section, this is especially important when considering manipulation online. 
 Drawing on this analysis, let us briefly return to the cases we discussed 
earlier in this article.94 Did Facebook, Uber, or Cambridge Analytica engage 
in manipulative practices? The Facebook case is the clearest. Its strategy 
memo described identifying moments when teenagers felt emotionally 
vulnerable and deploying advertisements to leverage that vulnerability. Such 
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94 See supra Part II. 
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practices are targeted to the individual level, exploit vulnerabilities by design, 
and are hidden—i.e., there is reason to believe few people targeted would 
know why they were seeing that particular advertisement at that particular 
moment. On our account, this is manipulative beyond any doubt. The only 
question, in this case, is whether Facebook engaged in the practice; the 
company denies that it did. 
 The Cambridge Analytica case has much in common with the 
Facebook case. By its own account, Cambridge Analytica attempted to 
“exploit what we knew about [voters]” and “target their inner demons” 95—
i.e., Cambridge Analytica aimed to frame political messages in ways each 
targeted individual was most inclined to accept and internalize. This practice 
is targeted and exploits individual vulnerabilities by design, and as in the case 
of Facebook above, there is little reason to believe that individuals seeing 
Cambridge Analytica’s advertisements would know either that the ads were 
tailored to them specifically or how the tailoring was accomplished. These 
practices are manipulative under our framework. Unlike with Facebook, we 
know that Cambridge Analytica actually engaged in these practices; it remains 
a mystery however, the extent to which they were effective. Even if 
Cambridge Analytica’s manipulative practices only had minor impacts on 
recent elections, we ought to treat this case as a cautionary tale. As we discuss 
in the next Part, these practices are likely to increase in power and 
sophistication. 
 Finally, Uber: this case is complicated, not least because there are so 
many potentially manipulative practices in which the company is known to 
have engaged. Some strategies seem clearly manipulative, such as 
intentionally misleading drivers with surge pricing “heat maps” that conflate 
real-time and predictive demand. But other strategies may not necessarily be 
manipulative. For example, automatically queuing the next ride request before 
the driver has time to decide whether or not to continue working might feel 
manipulative because it exploits the fact that we need time to make decisions. 
However, there is nothing hidden about this strategy. Drivers likely understand 
perfectly well what is happening, and though they may feel pressured, they 
likely do not feel tricked. Thus, on our account, automatic queueing is not an 
obviously manipulative practice, though there may be other reasons for 
questioning its ethical standing. 
 One last Uber practice is worth considering—namely, the notifications 
designed to nudge drivers to stay on the road. Much like automatic queuing, 
drivers may experience this pressure as manipulative, but as it is neither hidden 
nor significantly targeted, we ultimately judge it not to be so. As a nudge, it is 
designed to exploit drivers’ desire to accomplish goals, even if the goals are 
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functionally meaningless, but it is not a manipulative practice. Tweak some 
aspects of this scenario, however, and one can imagine future versions of this 
practice that are indeed manipulative. Consider if notifications were timed to 
appear right when drivers were desperate—say, if the earnings goals were not 
arbitrary, but instead were indexed to bills coming due. If the apparatus of 
such influence were hidden from the driver, manipulation would be a worry. 
 That possibility is important as we move into the next section, where 
we discuss more systematically how information technology can facilitate 
manipulation. Sometimes, as we have seen, technologically-mediated 
practices are manipulative; sometimes they are not. Our goal in the next 
section is to make clear how information technology and manipulation 
intersect.  
 MANIPULATION THROUGH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
 Having defined manipulation and developed the concept of 
manipulative practices, we are now in a position to address this article’s next 
question: what is it about information technology that, together with 
manipulation, makes such a worrying combination? Building on our definition 
of manipulation, generally, we define online manipulation as the use of 
information technology to covertly influence another person’s decision-
making. And, accordingly, we define online manipulative practices as 
applications of information technology that impose hidden influences on 
users, by targeting and exploiting decision-making vulnerabilities.  
We argue, below, that as digital technologies are incorporated into all 
aspects of people’s everyday lives, they become increasingly susceptible to 
this kind of manipulation. Widespread digital surveillance means it takes little 
effort to identify people’s vulnerabilities. Digital platforms are the perfect 
medium through which to leverage those insights. And because information 
technology mediates so much of so many people’s lives, there is virtually 
limitless opportunity to invisibly influence. 
 Surveillance 
 Living in an “Information Age” means that nearly everything people 
do is tracked.96 Both the information individuals knowingly disseminate about 
themselves (e.g., when they visit websites, make online purchases, and post 
 
96 See, e.g., SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN 
FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019); Julia Angwin, WHAT THEY KNOW (2019), 
http://juliaangwin.com/the-what-they-know-series/ [https://perma.cc/88QA-4LTU]. There is, 
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photographs and videos on social media) and the information they unwittingly 
provide (e.g., when those websites record data about how long they spend 
browsing them, where they are when they access them, and which 
advertisements they click on) reveals a great deal about who each individual 
is, what interests them, and what they find amusing, tempting, and off-
putting.97 Moreover, one need not “go online” in the traditional sense to be 
digitally tracked. Credit card purchases log what people buy in brick-and-
mortar stores,98 law enforcement license plate readers track where they drive,99 
and facial recognition software identifies them as they move through public 
spaces.100 The workplace has also become a site of intense digital surveillance. 
Private firms carefully monitor and analyze how their employees conduct 
themselves throughout the workday and beyond, leading to what some have 
called a new “digital Taylorism.”101 
 Tal Zarsky has warned that information technology could potentially 
be used to manipulate people by harnessing this wealth of information to 
precisely tailor advertisements that exploit their vulnerabilities.102 Ryan Calo 
has deepened Zarsky’s account by describing these practices in terms of what 
Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar call “market manipulation”—exploiting 
cognitive biases in order to influence consumer behavior.103 Calo updates 
 
97 As Julie Cohen argues, this information is a source of tremendous value and is treated by 
private firms as a repository of resources to be mined. Understood through the lens of political 
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of all sizes compete to discover new patterns and extract their marketplace value.” Julie E. 
Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal Construction of the Surveillance 
Economy, 31 PHIL. & TECH. 213 (2017). 
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101 See, e.g., Christian Parenti, Big Brother’s Corporate Cousin: High-Tech Workplace 
Surveillance is the Hallmark of a New Digital Taylorism, NATION (July 27, 2001), 
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Hanson and Kysar’s theory to reflect the increased capacities for market 
manipulation that information technology furnishes (what Calo calls “digital 
market manipulation”).104 For example, he points to the use of “disclosure 
ratcheting”—using behavioral nudges to dispose individuals to reveal more 
information about themselves than they intend (information which is then used 
to optimize further nudges)—and “means-based targeting”—using online 
experiments like A/B testing105 to tailor the presentation of each 
advertisement.106 
 On the whole, information that was once difficult and expensive to 
uncover is now available easily and cheaply. People reveal their vulnerabilities 
constantly, and as the Facebook case suggests, many parties are eager to 
accrue information in order to leverage it for manipulative ends. Importantly, 
ubiquitous digital surveillance means that people reveal information about 
their vulnerabilities not only through what some might judge frivolous or 
unnecessary disclosures—e.g., on social media. Rather, as the Uber case 
suggests, people are rendered susceptible to this kind of tracking merely in the 
routine, day-to-day activities of everyday life: going to work, commuting, and 
communicating, or even as the Cambridge Analytica case highlights, by 
simply being associated with others who make disclosures about themselves. 
 Digital Platforms 
 In addition to providing insight into vulnerabilities that advertisers, 
employers, and political campaigns may want to exploit, information 
technology also makes it increasingly easy to leverage those insights. As 
Karen Yeung argues, digital platforms facilitate “Big Data-driven decision-
guidance techniques,” which constitute a kind of “hypernudging.”107 Unlike 
traditional advertisements, which were static and disseminated en masse, 
digitally-mediated platforms, such as websites and social media applications, 
constitute dynamic, interactive, intrusive, and personalized choice 
 
104 Id. 
105 In website and app design, A/B testing is a method for determining the relative 
effectiveness of messaging strategies or user interface elements by presenting different 
variations to different groups of users and measuring user response. 
106 Calo, supra note 1, at 1012–14; see also Alessandro Acquisti et al., Privacy and Human 
Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 SCI. 509 (2015). 
107 Yeung, supra note 6, at 121; see also Lanzing, supra note 7. 
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architectures.108 Websites can alter the presentation of information depending 
on the specific things they know about each individual visitor. And if the 
websites do not know much, they can learn as users interact with them. If an 
advertiser knows that someone is more likely to buy things at a particular time 
of the day or a particular day of the week—as the Facebook case 
demonstrated—the advertiser does not have to wait, passively, for that person 
to browse past their campaigns; the advertiser can send emails or text 
notifications, or present themselves in the target’s social media feeds at 
optimal moments. And because this tailoring process is automated, it is fully 
personalized for each individual target. As Calo puts it, “firms will 
increasingly be in the position to create suckers, rather than waiting for one to 
be born.”109 
 Crucially, as Yeung points out, the insights into people’s 
vulnerabilities that digital platforms utilize in shaping their choice 
architectures are not limited to what can be gleaned from information collected 
about each individual. Platforms also enable “monitoring and refinement of 
the individual’s choice environment in light of population-wide trends 
identified via population-wide Big Data surveillance analysis.”110 In other 
words, the digital systems people interact with study both their individual 
idiosyncrasies and the patterns that emerge amongst demographic groups to 
which they belong, potentially revealing weaknesses and dispositions that 
individuals themselves cannot see. As Frank Pasquale argues, “the real basis 
of commercial success in Big Data-driven industries is likely the quantity of 
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relevant data collected in the aggregate—something not necessarily revealed 
or shared via person-by-person disclosure.”111  
 Mediation 
 Finally, there is a tendency to treat information technology as the kind 
of thing people approach, direct their attention toward, and engage with 
intention. But it is more appropriate to understand information technology as 
a set of tools that increasingly mediates everyday experience. Digital 
platforms are more like eyeglasses than magnifying glasses—technologies one 
wears and forgets about rather than those one picks up and puts to use. As Don 
Ihde argues, when people use such technologies, the technologies recede from 
view.112 They attend not to the eyeglasses themselves, but to what they can see 
through them.113 It is only when something goes wrong—when one cannot 
see through the glasses because they get dirty or break—that we notice the 
technology itself. Likewise, people pay very little attention to smartphones and 
computers themselves, focusing instead on the information they can access 
through them, the pictures they can see and videos they can watch, the things 
they can buy, and directions they can follow.114 Even the very tech-savvy, who 
understand what is going on behind-the-scenes of the technologies they use—
for example, the way data is collected and stored, analyzed and transmitted—
likely spend little time considering all that takes place under the hood. For the 
average person, information technology sits almost entirely outside conscious 
awareness; few ponder its nature and inner-functioning while they are actively 
engaged in using it.115 
 
111 PASQUALE, supra note 1, at 153; see also, Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, On Notice: 
The Trouble with Notice and Consent, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ENGAGING DATA FORUM: THE 
FIRST INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON THE APPLICATION AND MANAGEMENT OF PERSONAL 
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION (2009) (“Aggregated user data can be subject to computerized 
analyses to produce predictive models that can be used to estimate other like users’ propensity 
to respond to certain ads.”). 
112 See generally Don Ihde, Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth (1990). 
113 Id. 
114 Robert Rosenberger & Peter-Paul Verbeek, A Field Guide to Postphenomenology, in 
POSTPHENOMENOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON HUMAN-TECHNOLOGY RELATIONS 9, 
37–38 (Robert Rosenberger & Peter-Paul Verbeek eds., 2015). 
115 For more on what postphenomenologists call “transparency” (not to be confused with the 
notion of transparency as it is used in policy contexts) and its relation to using information 
technology, see Daniel Susser, Transparent Media and the Development of Digital Habits, in 
POSTPHENOMENOLOGY AND MEDIA: ESSAYS ON HUMAN-TECHNOLOGY-WORLD RELATIONS 
27 (Yoni Van Den Eede et al. eds., 2017); see also, Diane Michelfelder, Postphenomenology 
with an Eye to the Future, in POSTPHENOMENOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON 
HUMAN-TECHNOLOGY RELATIONS 237, 237–46 (Robert Rosenberger & Peter-Paul Verbeek 
eds., 2015). 
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 This is important to recognize in the context of worries about online 
manipulation because (as we argued in the previous section) lack of awareness 
is the defining feature of manipulative strategies. Beyond the fact that 
information technology provides insight into people’s vulnerabilities and 
furnishes platforms that can leverage those insights, it is designed to be seen 
through and is thus already, in a real sense, hidden. A world increasingly 
structured by information technology is a world increasingly removed from 
view—a world of screens people look through, cameras they walk past, and 
sensors they unknowingly impress upon. A determined manipulator could not 
dream up a better infrastructure through which to carry out his plans. 
 Furthermore, because information technology mediates so much of so 
many people’s lives, the reach of online manipulation is virtually limitless. 
Just as information technology increases the scale of other activities, it 
increases the potential scale of manipulative influence. Facebook, for instance, 
currently has more than 2 billion monthly active users.116 If its platform were 
leveraged to manipulate users—as it allegedly was in the Cambridge Analytica 
case—the impact could be massive.117 Uber has 75 million monthly active 
drivers.118 The strategies it devises to influence its drivers can affect what 
happens in millions of cars around the world. Unlike “offline manipulation,” 
which is constrained by the manipulator’s ability to understand and influence 
a finite number of other people, online manipulation is practically unbounded. 
 On the whole, information technology has made people’s 
vulnerabilities both easy to detect and easy to exploit. We have become more 
manipulable, and—there is reason to believe—more manipulated. 
 HARMS OF MANIPULATION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AUTONOMY 
 One might agree with everything we have claimed thus far but not be 
concerned. What harm does manipulation cause and why should anyone care 
that the insurgence of digital technologies into everyday life exacerbates it? A 
plausible answer might point to the motivations of manipulators and suggest 
that the reason for resorting to manipulation is generally to induce targets to 
 
116 Facebook Company Information, FACEBOOK, (accessed Nov. 13, 2019), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ [https://perma.cc/4Z3B-Q4HH]. 
117 In 2012, Facebook conducted its infamous “emotional contagion” experiment to gauge 
whether or not altering the content it showed users affected their emotional states, which 
involved more than 689,000 (unwitting) user-subjects. See Adam D.I. Kramer et al., 
Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion Through Social Networks, 111 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8788, 8788 (2014). 
118 Johana Bhuiyan, Uber Powered Four Billion Rides in 2017. It Wants To Do More—And 
Cheaper—in 2018, RECODE (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.recode.net/2018/1/5/16854714/uber-
four-billion-rides-coo-barney-harford-2018-cut-costs-customer-service 
[https://perma.cc/X9JJ-XYR8]. 
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act against their interests. If, for example, Facebook targeted advertisements 
at vulnerable teenagers, the suspicion would be that they did so to exploit 
moments of weakness, to incline teenagers to buy something they did not need 
or to pay more for it than they otherwise would. As Calo argues, it is not these 
forms of online influence alone that are cause for concern; rather, it is the fact 
that they are “coupled with divergent interests that should raise a red flag.”119 
According to such accounts, the incorporation of digital technologies into all 
aspects of people’s lives, and the attendant threat of manipulation, is worrying 
because the designers and operators of these technologies are often 
incentivized to subordinate others’ interests to theirs.  
 The subordination of interests, in certain cases, may be sufficient 
reason to condemn manipulative practices. But it fails to reach the heart of the 
matter. First, as we saw in the martini examples above, it is easy to imagine 
manipulative practices that advance, rather than diminish, a target’s interests. 
More importantly, beyond the direct, material harms that result from 
manipulation, such as exploitation, impoverishment, unfairness, and the 
deprivation of benefits, the deeper harm is infringement of individual 
autonomy. Since autonomy lies at the normative core of liberal democracies, 
the harm to autonomy rendered by manipulative practices extends beyond 
personal lives and relationships, reaching public institutions at a fundamental 
level. 
 In the following Section, we first clarify the conception of autonomy 
that motivates our analysis. Second, we look closer at the key characteristics 
of manipulation to expose how manipulative practices undermine autonomy. 
Our main focus is the hidden changes to choice architectures that exploit 
individual vulnerabilities. Finally, we consider possible objections to our 
account. 
 Autonomy at a Glance 
 Personal autonomy is the capacity to make one’s own choices, with 
respect to both existential and everyday decisions. As Joseph Raz, writes, 
“[t]he ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should 
make their own lives.”120 This notion of autonomy is rooted in the view that 
people can (mostly) rationally deliberate on the different options they are faced 
 
119 Calo, supra note 1, at 1023. 
120 RAZ, supra note 62, at 369; see also, e.g., Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Social Disruption, 
and Women, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, 
AND THE SOCIAL SELF 35, 37 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000) (“Autonomy 
involves choosing and living according to standards or values that are, in some plausible sense, 
one's own.”). 
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with, that they know (mostly and roughly) what they believe and desire, and 
that they can act on the reasons they think best.121 
 Autonomy theorists often distinguish between competency conditions 
and authenticity conditions.122 Autonomous persons have the cognitive, 
psychological, social, and emotional competencies to deliberate, to form 
intentions, and to act on the basis of that process. And autonomous persons 
can (at least in principle) critically reflect on their values, desires, and goals, 
and act for their own reasons—i.e., endorse them authentically as their own. 
Importantly, this conception of autonomy is not overly rationalistic—
autonomous persons deliberate on the basis of their beliefs and desires, as well 
as on the basis of their emotions, convictions, experiences, and commitments. 
While broad, this understanding of autonomy and its value is indispensable to 
a normative theory of manipulation: without recourse to some notion of 
autonomy there is no basis for holding people responsible for their actions, no 
way to ascribe authorship (or part-authorship) of behavior, to oneself or to 
others.123 
 But let us steer clear of two possible misunderstandings: first, 
autonomy is sometimes still understood entirely in terms of solipsistic 
“rational choosers,” without taking social contexts (and social others) into 
account.124 We agree with criticisms of this conception of autonomy and 
develop our own conception from theories of relational autonomy. Such 
accounts understand autonomy as a capacity of socially-situated persons, 
whose decisions issue from deliberative processes rich with emotion, feeling, 
imagination, and reason, and which are conditioned in part by their contexts.125 
 Second, in our view, autonomy is not a capacity of ideal choosers, but 
rather of ordinary people making decisions in their everyday lives. When we 
say that to act autonomously people have to be able to act for their own 
reasons, we do not mean that everyone must always and necessarily critically 
reflect on their every step. We mean that when questioned (by others or by 
themselves) people are generally able to identify some reasons for their 
 
121 See JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE POLITICS OF PERSONS: INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIO-
HISTORICAL SELVES 149–56 (2009); see generally AUTONOMY, OPPRESSION, AND GENDER 
(Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper eds., 2014); PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL OPPRESSION: 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Marina A.L. Oshana ed., 2015). 
122 See CHRISTMAN, supra note 121, at 155. 
123 See RAZ, supra note 62. 
124 See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF 
EVERYDAY PRACTICE 107–26 (2012). 
125 See Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, Introduction: Autonomy Refigured, in 
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE 
SOCIAL SELF 3, 4 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000).  
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actions, reasons they themselves can endorse.126 In other words, we are 
describing a hypothetically valid condition: if someone were to reflect on an 
action, that person could give a rough account of the reasons that motivated it. 
 On this account, autonomy is exercised by persons with particular 
identities and who always already live in social, cultural, political, and other 
contexts. Idealized conceptions of autonomy forget the “intersubjective and 
social dimensions of selfhood and identity for conceptions of individual 
autonomy and moral and political agency.”127 Social contexts and relations 
both enable and constrain autonomous choices.128 On one hand, autonomy 
requires living with others who teach one to act with reflection and 
deliberation, and it requires social contexts that enable autonomous choices by 
providing horizons of options. On the other hand, social contexts also 
condition choices because (often stereotypical) societal expectations influence 
the ways people choose.  
 Finally, autonomy is not only an individual good; it is also a social and 
political good. After all, people are not merely consumers, and markets are not 
the only institutions meant to respond to the preferences their decisions 
express; people also act as citizens, and democratic institutions are designed 
(ideally) to reflect autonomous decisions reached in the political sphere. When 
manipulators aim to elicit votes rather than purchases, it is the integrity of this 
realm—the political realm—that is called into question. As we saw in the 
Cambridge Analytica case, political advertisers have attempted to use 
psychographic profiling to create campaigns that exploit the decision-making 
vulnerabilities of individual voters. Such practices threaten the autonomy of 
citizens, and in doing so, they threaten democracy. Interfering with people’s 
autonomy is thus both an ethical concern and a political one.  
 
126 There is an interesting debate about which sorts of reasons should be acceptable here—any 
reasons, even seemingly delusional or irrational ones? Such questions are outside the scope 
of this Article. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 164–88 (1986) 
(discussing difference between subjective and objective reasons); SUSAN WOLF, MEANING IN 
LIFE AND WHY IT MATTERS 37 (2010) (discussing delusionary and irrational activities-cum-
reasons). 
127 Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 125, at 4. But one has to be careful here: although persons 
are always socially situated and have to realize their autonomy in social contexts, this does 
not imply that autonomy is only possible in (social and political) egalitarian relations 
supporting self-respect, self-esteem, and self-trust—and thereby autonomy. See Joel 
Anderson & Axel Honneth, Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice, in 
AUTONOMY AND THE CHALLENGES TO LIBERALISM: NEW ESSAYS 127 (John Christman & Joel 
Anderson eds., 2005). 
128 See Friedman, supra note 120, at 35.  
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 Autonomy and Manipulation 
Throughout this article, we have argued that manipulative practices are 
characterized by the hiddenness of their influence on decision-making. By 
fine-tuning the contexts in which individuals choose—their choice 
architectures—a manipulator can exploit each person’s decision-making 
vulnerabilities, and in doing so interfere with their beliefs, desires, emotions, 
and behavior. But why is it that these interferences undermine autonomy? 
How do they differ from, say, overt guilt trips or transparent forms of 
pressure—influences we deem non-manipulative? 
 Autonomy, Manipulation and Choice Architecture 
 As we have seen, manipulators intentionally alter the contexts in which 
their targets make decisions. But, unlike those who persuade or coerce, 
manipulators do so without the target’s conscious awareness. The hiddenness 
of manipulation challenges both conditions of autonomy—competency and 
authenticity. Because manipulees are unaware that features of their choice 
environments have been intentionally designed to influence them, their 
capacity to (competently) deliberate is undermined, yielding decisions they 
cannot endorse (authentically) as their own.  
 In many cases of behavioral advertising that is obviously the point. 
Without realizing that their choice architectures were constructed to influence 
them, subtle cues are used to tempt or seduce people to buy things. So-called 
“native advertising”—advertisements designed to mimic the appearance of 
non-advertising content—provides an especially clear example of a 
manipulative online practice, since it intentionally conflates information and 
advertising. While reading the news or browsing social media, people 
contextualize and understand the information they absorb within that frame. It 
requires special vigilance to identify and re-contextualize native 
advertisements, in order to competently evaluate them. 
 The vast stores of information and detailed behavioral profiles 
compiled about each individual greatly facilitate manipulative practices. The 
more that is known about each person’s personality, preferences, habits, and 
vulnerabilities, the easier it is to construct choice environments that will guide 
their decision-making in the desired direction. In addition, as we argued in the 
previous section, the less users know about the inner-workings of the 
technologies that facilitate online manipulation, the easier it is for these 
mechanisms to function, making online manipulation especially worrying and 
its potential threat to autonomy so grave.  
 The relationship between manipulation, autonomy, and the 
construction of choice architectures raises another issue worth mentioning. We 
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pointed out in Part II that, at an abstract level, there are two ways to influence 
a person’s decision-making: changing the options available to them and 
changing how they understand their options. Some argue that the term 
“manipulation” has two distinct senses, each corresponding to one of these 
strategies.129 Manipulating a person involves interfering directly with their 
psychological processes, whereas manipulating a situation involves 
interfering with the options available to them. In our view, the preceding 
discussion reveals the limits of this distinction. Manipulators often change the 
choices available to someone—their situation—precisely to interfere with 
their decision-making processes. The construction of online choice contexts 
makes this clear. While it can be helpful in certain contexts to draw attention 
to the differences between situations and persons, explaining manipulation 
requires a holistic understanding. In autonomous actions, the person and the 
situation are always interconnected; one cannot be analyzed without the other. 
 Crucial to the self-understanding of autonomous actors is the sense that 
the choices they make are their choices, that they know what they are doing, 
and that they can, in principle, endorse the terms of their decisions. Hidden 
adjustments to people’s choice environments fundamentally interfere  with 
their autonomy, threatening their ability to act for reasons of their own.130 As 
we have seen, this works so well online because online environments are 
especially well-suited to identifying the adjustments that most effectively 
shape people’s choices.  
 
129 See Claudia Mills, Politics and Manipulation, 21 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 97 (1995). 
130 This point can also be expressed through a traditional Kantian vocabulary. When 
manipulated, people are treated purely as means, and not, at the same time, as ends in 
themselves. In this way, manipulation can be understood as reification: people are being made 
into things; or, as Kant would put it, they are treated as not having dignity, but a price. 
Examining the problem through this lens is useful as well, as it reveals another worrying effect 
of manipulation: when people are treated solely as means, and not as ends in themselves, it 
likely has an impact on their self-understanding. See Jeremy Waldron, It’s All for Your Own 
Good, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/10/09/cass-
sunstein-its-all-your-own-good/ (“What becomes of the self-respect we invest in our own 
willed actions, flawed and misguided though they often are, when so many of our choices are 
manipulated to promote what someone else sees (perhaps rightly) as our best interest?”) 
[perma.cc link unavailable]. Here, Waldron criticizes nudges exercised for paternalist aims, 
but it is easy to see how much more damaging nudges are when people are manipulated not 
for the sake of paternalist aims but for the sake of sheer acquisitiveness. 
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 Manipulation and Vulnerabilities 
 The concept of vulnerability has recently received a great deal of 
philosophical attention.131 Scholars have focused on different aspects of 
vulnerability, with some exploring the distinction between ontological and 
contingent vulnerabilities, others questioning whether vulnerability is a 
special source of moral obligations, and so on.132 Following Catriona 
Mackenzie and others’ example,133 we distinguish ontological 
vulnerabilities—vulnerabilities all human beings share in virtue of their 
embodied condition—from situated, socially constructed, or contingent 
vulnerabilities, which will be our primary focus. 
 Contingent vulnerabilities can result from structural conditions or 
individual differences.134 Structural vulnerabilities derive from the fact that 
individuals are also members of groups, which enjoy varying degrees of 
privilege and experience varying levels of discrimination. For example, one 
might be vulnerable because of economic disadvantage, or on account of one’s 
gender or sexual identity. Individual vulnerabilities, on the other hand, are 
those that exist irrespective of group memberships and may be the result of a 
person’s particular history, circumstances, personality, habits, or practices. 
For instance, one person might be more vulnerable to online manipulation than 
another person who is similarly socially situated if the latter is more 
technologically savvy. Moreover, contingent vulnerabilities can overlap and 
exacerbate each other. Structural conditions can make a person more 
susceptible to having their individual weaknesses targeted and exploited. For 
example, many communities of color in America are more closely surveilled 
than white communities.135 As a result, there is more information available 
 
131 See generally VULNERABILITY, AUTONOMY, AND APPLIED ETHICS (Christine Straehle ed., 
2016); VULNERABILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN ETHICS AND FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY (Catriona 
Mackenzie et al. eds., 2013). 
132 See VULNERABILITY, AUTONOMY, AND APPLIED ETHICS, supra note 131, at 1–10. Some 
authors see an incompatibility between autonomy and vulnerability; we do not share this view 
but cannot go into detail here. The form of vulnerability that we analyze in the following does 
not follow precisely the taxonomies that these authors suggest. See, e.g., id.; VULNERABILITY: 
NEW ESSAYS IN ETHICS AND FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY, supra note 131. 
133 Catriona Mackenzie et al., Introduction, in VULNERABILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN ETHICS AND 
FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 1 (Catriona Mackenzie et al. eds., 2013). 
134 Id. 
135 Alvaro M. Bedoya, The Color of Surveillance: What an Infamous Abuse of Power 
Teaches Us About the Modern Spy Era, SLATE (Jan. 18, 2016), 
https://slate.com/technology/2016/01/what-the-fbis-surveillance-of-martin-luther-king-says-
about-modern-spying.html [https://perma.cc/U27Z-H5YR].  
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about the individual vulnerabilities of people of color living in those 
communities, potentially rendering them more vulnerable to manipulation.136 
 Thus, vulnerabilities are not monolithic—they represent a variety of 
pressure-points, which can be exploited in a number of ways. Manipulative 
practices can reinforce and be reinforced by structural vulnerabilities, but they 
take advantage of the individual vulnerabilities of particular persons. 
Consequently, and as we have seen throughout, the more information a would-
be manipulator has about a person’s specific vulnerabilities, the more capably 
they can exploit them.  
 Distinguishing between the various kinds of vulnerabilities helps 
emphasize a significant difference between online manipulation and the old-
fashioned manipulative practices characteristic of some pre-digital 
advertising. Rather than aiming only to exploit vulnerabilities almost all of us 
share, as television advertisements and static billboards often attempt to do, 
online manipulation targets individuals, exploiting vulnerabilities specific to 
them. 
 Objections and Responses 
 There are at least two potential objections to our account of the 
autonomy harms manipulation threatens. First, one might object that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether a person’s choices are made 
autonomously. As such, how could one determine in any particular case 
whether or not someone else has been manipulated?  
 In response, we emphasize our focus on manipulative practices, rather 
than manipulation per se. While it is indeed difficult to determine if someone 
has been manipulated in a particular instance (requiring information about the 
target’s beliefs, the intentions of the alleged manipulator, and so on), much 
can be surmised by investigating the influence strategy itself. Rather than 
attempting to determine whether the target of influence was moved or whether 
the influence was successfully hidden, we should attempt to determine 
whether the influencer was trying to conceal their efforts, whether the 
influence was intended to exploit the manipulee’s vulnerabilities, and to what 
extent the influence was targeted. Manipulative practices—characterized, as 
we have argued, by concealment, exploitation of vulnerabilities, and 
targeting—are cause for concern, regardless of whether they succeed in every 
instance. Indeed, adopting this perspective allows one to reframe the issue at 
 
136 The exploitation of structural vulnerabilities thus has discriminatory consequences. This 
problem has been discussed in the literature several times, but not with a focus on 
manipulation. See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 1, at 38; see generally CATHY O’NEIL, 
WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS 
DEMOCRACY 70 (2016). 
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a macro level: as we have argued throughout, information technology 
increasingly pervades and mediates nearly all aspects of our lives. If online 
manipulation becomes standard practice and thus an integral and 
indistinguishable part of our lives, it will become ever more difficult to 
identify specific cases of manipulation, and thus to think and talk about 
autonomous individuals who are responsible for their actions at all. 
 A second objection asks whether some alleged manipulees might not 
have behaved in the same way even if they hadn’t been the subjects of 
manipulation. In other words, it points to a counterfactual component of claims 
to manipulation—that absent the manipulative intervention, the target would 
have decided differently.137 Although some argue that this condition must be 
fulfilled for an influence to count as manipulative, i.e., the influence must 
change the way the target would have acted absent the influence, on our 
account manipulation interferes with the decision-making process, 
irrespective of its outcome, and one can therefore be manipulated even without 
such a change. While this may seem counterintuitive, it points to an issue of 
deep significance. The distinguishing feature of autonomy is that people want 
to make choices for themselves, and they would feel estranged from their 
choices if they knew they were being secretly driven toward a certain result. 
Autonomous choices and the decision procedures that yield those choices 
express who the decider is. As T.M. Scanlon argued: 
I want to choose the furniture for my own apartment, pick out 
the pictures for the walls, and even write my own lectures 
despite the fact that these things might be done better by a 
decorator, art expert, or talented graduate student. For better or 
worse, I want these things to be produced by and reflect my 
own taste, imagination, and powers of discrimination and 
analysis. I feel the same way, even more strongly, about 
important decisions affecting my life in larger terms: what 
career to follow, where to work, how to live.138  
Scanlon shows that it is not just the result that matters when someone acts 
autonomously, but rather the choice-making, the processes of making up one’s 
own mind. Autonomous choosers want to be in a position, at least in principle, 
to stand behind their choices with reasons of their own. 
 Finally, a third objection concerns a problem mentioned earlier: since 
autonomy is always socially situated, choices are always framed and 
conditioned by features of their social contexts. Indeed, social, cultural, 
 
137 See generally GOODIN, supra note 72. 
138 Thomas Scanlon, The Significance of Choice, in 7 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN 
VALUES 149, 180 (1986). 
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economic, and political contexts determine the sets of options from which one 
chooses in the first place. Thus, it can be difficult to draw a line between 
contextual influences and the influences of manipulators.  
 Imagine deciding to pursue a university education. In addition to 
determining whether or not someone is even given the option to pursue a 
university education, their social, cultural, political, and economic contexts 
may frame the decision in a particular way. For instance, girls may be 
discouraged from pursuing a technical education or dissuaded from training to 
become doctors because they are told that women are “better suited” to other 
careers. While this kind of treatment is sometimes called manipulative, it is 
not the kind of manipulation we have in mind.139 And there are decisive 
differences between this kind of influence and online manipulation. Most 
important to our analysis, online manipulation is aimed precisely at individual 
choosers, and it is the specific information about each target that enables 
online manipulators to exploit that target’s vulnerabilities. As discussed in the 
previous section, information about groups can reveal individual 
vulnerabilities, and individual vulnerabilities can be exacerbated by structural 
conditions, which discriminate against groups. However, for the purposes of 
this analysis, these disparate sources of vulnerability can and must be 
distinguished from one another. 
 Furthermore, while it is sometimes difficult to define the specific 
beneficiaries of structural conditions (such as gender-stereotyping), the parties 
benefiting from manipulative online practices are easy to find. Critically 
analyzing structural conditions thus requires different terms and different 
theoretical tools than the forms of manipulation at issue here.140 
 On the whole, we have seen that using autonomy as the normative lens 
through which to understand the harms of online manipulation helps 
foreground its individual, social, and political effects. The consequences are 
manifold. On one hand, manipulative practices undermine individual 
autonomy—people’s capacity for self-government, their ability to pursue their 
own goals. This is troubling in itself. But perhaps more worrying are the 
threats to collective self-government. When citizens are targets of online 
manipulation and voter decisions rather than purchase decisions are swayed 
by hidden influence, democracy itself is called into question. Add to this the 
fact that the tools of online manipulation are concentrated in only a few hands, 
 
139 See, e.g., Ann E. Cudd, Adaptations to Oppression: Preference, Autonomy and Resistance, 
in PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL OPPRESSION: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 142 
(Marina A.L. Oshana ed., 1st ed. 2015); see generally SERENE KHADER, ADAPTIVE 
PREFERENCES AND WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT (2011). 
140 For literature on analyzing discrimination in liberal democracies, see, for instance, SALLY 
HASLANGER, RESISTING REALITY: SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION AND SOCIAL CRITIQUE (2012), and 
ANN CUDD, ANALYZING OPPRESSION (2006). 
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and it is easy to see how the nexus of influence and information technology 
stands to make already problematic power dynamics far worse. 
 CONCLUSION 
 Our aim in this Article has been to put forward a systematic account of 
the nature of online manipulation, how it differs from other forms of influence, 
and what harms it threatens, to both individuals and society at large. The 
question that remains unanswered is, of course, how these threats can be 
addressed. Our Article offers a starting point and guide for answering that 
question. 
 First, online manipulation poses a threat across a wide variety of social 
contexts—from commercial contexts, to the workplace, to the political realm. 
Importantly, normative commitments regarding the types and degree of 
influence vary with each sphere. In the United States, for example, consumer 
decisions are generally considered less worthy of protection from outside 
influence than political decisions. With the rise of algorithmically mediated 
labor, protection for decision-making in the workplace will be the subject of 
much future debate. Therefore, we must pay close attention to where—in 
which spheres of life—influence is exerted, and what the effects of that 
influence mean for the individuals inhabiting them.  
 Second, because manipulation is, by our definition, hidden, combating 
it requires extra vigilance. The effects will often only become apparent after 
the harm has already been done. Further, the threat of online manipulation 
presents additional challenges to the predominant model of data regulation in 
the United States, which places the full burden of managing information flows 
and data practices on individuals.141 This model assumes that people are aware 
of the ways data about them is flowing and the risks and benefits associated 
with the data practices that implicate them. The emergence and proliferation 
of hidden, manipulative online practices pushes beyond the outermost limits 
of this approach. Individuals, unaware of the ways data is collected, 
aggregated, and used to influence them, simply cannot be left alone to fend off 
these incursions into their everyday decision-making. Bringing meaningful 
regulation to the digital sphere is no easy task. However, given that the tools 
 
141 See, e.g., Daniel Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 1880 (2013). In Europe, data protection law works differently and follows slightly 
different principles, certainly since the implementation of the GDPR in May 2018. See Natali 
Helberger et al., The Perfect Match? A Closer Look at the Relationship Between EU Consumer 
Law and Data Protection Law, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1427, 1431 (2017) (“Data 
protection law operates on the basis of a number of central principles: lawfulness, fairness and 
transparency; purpose limitation; data minimization; accuracy; storage limitation; integrity 
and confidentiality; and accountability.”) (internal citations omitted). They also point out the 
potentially fruitful connection between the GDPR and European consumer law. 
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of online manipulation are largely controlled by a few powerful actors, we 
should begin our efforts by holding them to account. 
 Finally, many of the manipulative practices causing concern today 
evolved from advertising practices that have long been tolerated. If we are 
right about the nature of harm wrought by manipulative practices, we should 
no longer concede this ground. Although some forms of consumer targeting 
might be acceptable, we have suggested that even within the advertising 
sphere, there is a line that ought not to be crossed. Moreover, advertising may 
have received disproportionate attention from the research community 
because it is the visible tip of the iceberg. Understanding manipulative 
advertising provides insight into what might lie beneath. The use of 
information technology to facilitate manipulative practices greatly enhances 
their ability to shape our decision-making, raising anew questions about their 
ethical and political legitimacy.
